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SPACING OUT:
TOWARDS A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHY
OF LAW©
By NICHoLAs K. BLOMLEY*

AND JOEL

C. BAKAN**

The authors analyze the interconnections between space, law, and power and
forge links between critical studies in law and geography. Analytical categories
of space-for example, the divide between public and private space, or the

concept of national citizenship-are all politically constructed. The authors
analyze Canadian and American concepts of federalism and their impact on
regulating worker safety. A common judicial mapping of work, local space,
and state regulation determines whether local officials have enforcement

authority in contexts where national worker safety regulations apply. Through
this analysis, the authors illustrate the potential for future studies in critical
legal geography.

is too important to be left to the lawyers.
'Law' ...
Lawrence Friedman

1

Geography is too important to be left to geographers.
David Harvey

2

© Copyright, 1992, Nicholas K. Blomley and Joel C. Bakan.
* Department of Geography, Simon Fraser University.
** Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia. This paper is based on an article originally
published as J. Bakan & N. Blomley, "Spatial Categories, Legal Boundaries, and the Judicial
Mapping of the Worker" (1992, forthcoming) 24 Env't & Plan. A. Given the interdisciplinary
nature of our argument we felt it appropriate to also seek publication in a legal journal. In so doing,
we have revised and extended our argument. We are very grateful to the editors of both
Environment and Planning A and the Osgoode Hall Law Journal for their cooperation. We also
appreciate the helpful comments of an anonymous referee, as well as the criticisms of Trevor
Barnes, David Cohen, Robert Grant, Marlee Kline, and Peter Marden on earlier drafts. Any errors
or omissions are solely the responsibility of the authors.
1 "The Law and Society Movement" (1986) 38 Stan. L Rev. 763 at 780.
2 "On the History and Present Condition of Geography: An Historical Materialist Manifesto"
(1984) 36 Prof. Geographer 1 at 7.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper seeks to transcend a deep-seated division of
intellectual labour. It analyzes the imbrication of space, law, and power
and attempts to forge a closer link between critical traditions in the
disciplines of law and geography. Such an exploration, long overdue, is
important for the development of socio-legal studies. Until recently, the
relationship between law and space has been largely underplayed and
confused. The continued invisibility of space within legal studies and of
law within geography not only limits the analytical potential of each but,
more importantly, contributes problematically to the presentation of law
and space as pre-political categories. In this paper, we will note the
extent of the curious divide between traditional legal and geographic
research, which belies the ostensibly interdisciplinary character of each
discipline. However, we will also argue that critical researchers who
attempt the exploratory crossing between law and geography are assisted
by a number of developments, including a shared scepticism on the part
of both critical lawyers and critical geographers towards the supposedly
objective status of law and space. Partly in response to this, recent years
have seen a number of exploratory forays from both disciplines.
One of the reasons for the apparent invisibility of space as an
analytical category within legal studies rests with the modernist
ascendancy of historical analysis within social theory3 Certainly, critical
studies within law have largely relied upon history in their attempts to
argue against the closure of law. While this contributes to the invisibility
3 See R.W. Gordon, "Critical Legal Histories" (1984) 36 Stan. L. Rev. 57.
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of space, it also serves as an analogical basis for a spatialization of law.
Legal actors can be understood not only as constructing historical
representations, but also as defining and dividing legal geographies. Such
geographies, we will argue, are of more than passing interest. Just as
representations of history may buttress legal claims to rationality and
closure, so may certain renderings of space. Further, just as such
histories are contingent and contradictory, so are the geographies of law.
Given the paucity of research in this field, however, any legal/geographic
argument must be tentative. We try to illustrate ours with an important
legal debate in Canada and the United States about federalism and the
regulation of worker safety. The central question is whether local
officials, acting under provincial or state regulatory regimes, have
enforcement authority in contexts where national worker-safety
regulations apply. We will argue that similarities between the Canadian
and American legal decisions concerning this question can be explained
in part by a common judicial mapping of work, local space, and state
regulation.
II. LAW AND GEOGRAPHY
Legal culture is
based upon an authoritarian monologue of initiation. It is a culture confined within the
parameters of a professionalised and esoteric language, in turn supported by a

jurisprudence of legal uni-vocality within which the institutional meaning of law is always
4

given and merely remains to be said.

The apparent exclusion of geography under these conditions is not
surprising. Legal interpretation, as a discursive practice, appears
resolutely closed to external influences, admitting them only under
conditions of its own choosing. In a trenchant account of the
relationship between legal discourse and the multiple geographies of
social life, Wesley Pue has argued that law is, in this sense, "antigeographical."5 By this, he means that the legal mentality is curiously
acontextual, such that legal relations and obligations are frequently
4 P. Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics,Rhetoricaand LegalAnalysis (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1987) at 97.
5 "Wrestling with Law: (Geographical) Specificity vs. (Legal) Abstraction" (1990) 11 Urb.

Geography 566 at 568 [emphasis in original].
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thought of by the courts and other legal agencies as existing in a purely
conceptual space, with little recognition of their spatial heterogeneity or
the local material contexts within which law is understood and contested.
Geography, then, can challenge the self-acclaimed rationality of the legal
order. It can challenge, as well, traditional legal theory, which is largely
unconscious of geographic questions, even when exploring the link
between law and society. With a few notable exceptions, such as the
work of comparative legal scholar John Wigmore, space appears to have
been largely downplayed in legal theory.6 This replicates a pervasive
modernist downgrading of the spatial, perhaps deriving from the
Kantian distinction between the activism of the historical and the
passivity of the spatial. Explanatory power is thought to lie with history,
not with the inertia of space.7
Silence about space is also problematic for critical legal
scholarship. Whether political, economic, or postmodern in inspiration,
critical analyses of law profess suspicion of disciplinary boundaries and
the stability of the traditional core of legal endeavour, leading to an
efflorescence of interdisciplinary research, with exciting and productive
exchanges between legal studies and feminism, literary theory, critical
race theory, political theory, history, and sociology. The absence of
geography in this context is striking. Again, it perhaps derives from the
deeper invisibility of the space/society link within the modernist,
theoretical underpinnings of critical research. Marx, for example, saw
space as "an unnecessary complication."'8 The meta-histories of time,
not the geographies of space, provided the focus for critical analysis.
Similarly, Gordon has noted that "critical legal writers pay a lot of
attention to history." 9 In fact, "they have probably devoted more pages
to historical description ...
than anything." 10 The consequence has been

6 j. Wigmore, A Panorama of the World's Legal Systems (St. Paul: West, 1928); and J.
Wigmore, "A Map of the World's Law" (1929) 19 Geographical Rev. 114.
7 E.W. Soja, Postmodem Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Modem Social Theory

(London: Verso, 1989).
8 As cited in D. Harvey, The Urban Eiperience (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) at 5.
9 Supra note 3 at 57.
10

Ibid.
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the construction of an historical epistemology that sees the world
primarily through the dynamics arising from the emplacement of social being and
becoming in the interpretive contexts of time: in what Kant called nacheinander and
Marx defined ... as the contingently constrained 'making of history.' This enduring
epistemological presence has preserved a privileged place for the 'historical imagination'
11
in defining the very nature of critical insight and interpretation.

Meanwhile, academic geography has not only acquiesced and
even cooperated in its legal invisibility, it has returned the insult by
effectively downplaying or ignoring law. Again, with a few exceptions,
mainstream geographic research on legal questions is sporadic and
almost incidental.12 Much of it takes the form of "impact analyses,"
wherein the geographer tracks the effect of a specific law or ruling on a
geographic configuration, such as a housing market.1 3 The implicit
divide between legal, social, and spatial categories characteristic of these
analyses and the refusal to engage in deeper analysis of legal discourse
14
serve to reproduce the problematic law/society and law/space divides.
As in legal studies, however, a critical strain of geographic
research has emerged in recent years. Drawing upon debates within
social theory and postmodernism, it has simultaneously imported
insights from other fields and argued for the analytic relevance of space
to researchers outside geography. Space, in this work, is far from empty
or asocial; it is deeply political. Critical human geography has devoted
considerable energy to examining the spatiality of structures that
constrain human action and social consciousness, with special attention
given to the politics of race, class, and gender. Therefore, a neglect of
legal ideology and legal discourse amongst such analyses is surprising.
Even when geographers consider law-through regulation theory, for
15
example-they often do so in an unsophisticated manner.
Despite their mutual indifference, the academic disciplines of
geography demonstrate striking internal symmetries and share
and
law
11 Soja, supranote 7 at 10.
12 D. Whittlesey, "The Impress of Effective Central Authority upon the Landscape" (1935) 25
Annals A. Am. Geographers 85.
13 G.L. Clark, "The Geography of Law" in R. Peet & N. Thrift, eds., New Models in
Geography: Tihe Political-EconomyPerspective (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990) 310.
14 N.K. Blomley, "Text and Context: Rethinking the Law-Space Nexus" (1989) 13 Progress in
Hum. Geography 512.
15
P. Marden, "'Real' Regulation Reconsidered" (1992) 24 Env't & Plan. A 751.
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numerous areas of inquiry. For example, each has well-developed
analyses of federalism and the appropriate locus of state regulation.
Moreover, the mainstream methodologies of the two disciplines are
parallel, each relying on what might be termed instrumentalist 16 and
formalist 17 methodologies. However, the possibility for forging a
connection between law and geography lies not here, but within the
critical traditions of each discipline. Despite the apparent divide
between law and geography, a theoretical symmetry can be identified
that offers a basis for cross-over. Both critical legal and geographic
studies interrogate the categories relied upon within each disciplinary
mainstream-law in legal studies, space in geography. Arguing that
these categories are socially constructed, they reveal a shared scepticism
towards the ontological status of their respective discipline cores. Law
and space are understood as relational, acquiring meaning through
social action; rather than as objective, existing logically prior to and
separate from social and political relations.18 Critical lawyers and
critical geographers, respectively, have rejected legal science, spatial
science, and their claims that law and space can be understood as
separate from society. They have concentrated instead upon the
political and ideological significance of space and law, and their
representations within the mainstream of each discipline and wider
social discourse.
Thus, for example, in geography, it has been argued that the
evolution of the landscape aesthetic as a "way of seeing" was not a
purely autonomous or technical event, but was bound up with the
evolution of capitalist social relations.19 Similarly, cartography is
16 Compare, for example, the geographer, R.J. Bennett, "Assignment of Competency and

Resources" in RJ. Bennett, ed., Territory andAdministration in Europe (London: Pinter, 1989) 54;
and R.J. Bennett, "Decentralization, Local Governments and Markets: Towards a Post Welfare
Agenda" in R.J. Bennett, ed., Decentralization,Local Governments and Markets: Towards a Post
Welfare Agenda (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) 1; with the lawyer, J.H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory ofJudicialReview (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980).
17 Compare the geographer, J.R.V. Prescott, PoliticalFrontiers and Boundaries (London:
Allen and Unwin, 1987); and the lawyer, P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985).
18
See, for example, in geography, D. Harvey, The Conditionof Postmoderniy: An Enquiry into
the Originsof Cultural Change (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); and in law, A.C. Hutchinson, ed.,

CriticalLegalStudies (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1989).
19

D.E. Cosgrove, SocialFormationand Symbolic Landscape (London: Croon Helm, 1984).
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understood as speaking more powerfully of political imperatives and
tensions than representing purely technical and scientific spatial truths.2 0
In a parallel fashion, critical lawyers have demonstrated that social
relations portrayed within the legal system as natural, necessary, and
pre-political-like the family, contractual relations, or private ownership
of property-are indeed deeply social and political. They have also

shown that interpretations of allegedly neutral and universal legal
standards represent particular political imperatives 21 The parallels
between the two critical literatures are evident if one compares the

following passages-the first about space and the second about law:
Space is not a scientific object removed from ideology or politics; it has always been
political and strategic. If space has an air of neutrality and indifference with regard to its
contents and thus seems to be "purely" formal, the epitome of rational abstraction, it is
precisely because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus
of past processes ...
Space has been shaped and moulded from historical and natural
elements, but this has been a political process. Space is political and ideological. It is a
product literally filled with ideologies.2 2
For CLS [critical legal studies], critique must begin and proceed with the operation of law
as ideology. ... For CLS, the rule of law is a mask that lends to existing social structures
the appearance of legitimacy and inevitability; it transforms the contingency of social
history into a fixed set of structural arrangements and ideological commitments.... [Tihe
status quo and its intellectual footings, far from being built on the hard rock of historical
23
necessity, are actually sited on the shifting sands of social contingency.

The assumed passivity and objectivity of the spatial and the legal,
and their often technical representation, render them especially opaque
to critical insight. A central concern in both critical literatures is that
20 See R. Helgerson, "The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in
Renaissance England" (1986) 16 Representations 51. Other examples might include Paul Carter's
discussion of the different representations of space by Europeans and by Aborigines in Australia in
his The Road to Botany Bay: An Explorationof Landscapeand History (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1988); and Allan Pred's study of street control in nineteenth century Stockholm in his Lost Words
andLost Worlds: Modernity and the Language of Everyday Life in Late Nineteenth Century Stockholm
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
21 For general discussions of critical approaches in legal studies, see Hutchinson, supra note
18; R.F. Devlin, ed., CanadianPerspectives on Legal Theory (Toronto: Emond-Montgomery, 1991);
D. Kairys, ed., The Politics ofLaw: A ProgressiveCritique, rev. ed. (New York: Pantheon, 1990); B.
Fine, Democracy and the Rule of Law (London: Pluto Press, 1984); and C. Smart, Feminism and the
PowerofLaw (London: Routledge, 1989).
22 H. Lefebvre, "Reflections on the Politics of Space" (1976) 8 Antipode 30 at 31.
23 A.C. Hutchinson, "Crits and Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin (Or was it Googly?)" in
Devlin ed., supranote 21, 181 at 183.
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space and law are frequently reified-social relations are represented
and experienced through legal and spatial categories and conventions as
fixed, natural, objective, and thus asocial and apolitical. In itself, this
does not merit much attention. However, critical scholarship strives to
prove that the hegemony of particular reified conventions and
representations, and the concomitant exclusion of other frameworks,
partly shape human experience of the social world. The ever-present
danger is that such representations come to be seen as true knowledge,
thus obfuscating the contingency of social life and the need and
possibilities for change. In other words, the notion that "things could be
different" is made unintelligible by powerful frames of reference and
understanding. This has been a central concern for both critical
geographic and critical legal literatures. The two literatures have tended
to argue in parallel, relying on similar theoretical claims about space and
law, respectively, though there has been little overlap between the two
lines of argument.
III. CROSSING THE DIVIDE
In this paper we suggest that the absence of a dialogue between
critical perspectives in law and geography foreshortens the critical reach
and intellectual potential of each. In many instances there exist
powerful ideological conjunctions between the reified representations of
space and law. Understanding these is important for critical social
theory. A small but growing literature has begun to map out the
law/space nexus. It is more systematized within geography than within
law-recent years have seen the publication of a number of collections
and review essays 24-but the writings of legal scholars also contain
intriguing insights. Examples can be found in Wesley Pue's discussion of
the "insurrectionary" effect of geography within law;25 Boaventura de
Sousa Santos's attention to the link between geographic scale and the
politics of legal interpretation; 26 and David Engel's discussion of legal
24 See, for example, Blomley, supra note 14; Clark, supra note 13; and N.K. Blomley, Law,
Space and the Geographiesof Power (New York: Guilford Press, forthcoming).
25

Supra note 5 at 575-79.

26 "Law: A Map of Misreading: Towards a Postmodern Conception of Law" (1987) 14 J. L
& Soe'y 279.
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interpretation in Thailand, with an account of the forcible imposition of
an a-spatial and individualized modern grid upon a traditionally
variegated, contextual, and deeply local legal map in which "who one
was could not be separated conceptually from where one was."' 27 This
literature offers some comfort for our endeavour but does not provide a
well articulated theoretical position from which to proceed.
In this paper, we begin with the claim that legal thought and
legal practice contain a number of representations-or geographies-of
the multiple spaces of political, social, and economic life. Much as law
relies in various ways on claims concerning history and time, it also
simultaneously defines and draws upon a complex range of geographies
and spatial understandings. While struggling to make sense of the
complexity and ambiguity of social life, legal agents-whether judges,
legal theorists, administrative officers, or others-represent and evaluate
space in various ways. When we start looking, we discover that such
representations are abundant and varied, touching all aspects of legal
and social life, such as property, crime, contractual relations,
intergovernmental relations, and so on. The construction of such spaces
can be seen, for example, when legal actors designate boundaries
between public and private spaces, make decisions concerning the
autonomy of local governmental actors, or consider questions of
personal mobility or spatial equality. Legal spaces are also relied upon
implicitly on many other occasions. Legal interpretation, for example,
with its encoded claims concerning the placement of the individual legal
subject and the balance between universal and particularized legal
knowledge, implies a claim about the situated contextuality of law. An
assertion of legal closure constitutes not only a rejection of the
historicity of social life but also its spatiality.
The construction of legal spaces is a central part of a broader
process by which law and social life are interpreted. The representation
and evaluation of space in legal discourse, as in the construction and
value ascribed to mobility or the locality, is constituted by, and is in turn
constitutive of, broader accounts of social and political life under law.
Space, like law, is not an empty or objective category, but has a direct
bearing on the way power is deployed and social life constituted. The
geographies of law are neither passive backdrops in the legal process,
27 "Litigation Across Space and Time: Courts, Conflict and Social Change" (1990) 24 L &

Soe'y Rev. 333 at 339 [emphasis in original].
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nor of random import; they can, in combination with their implied
claims concerning social life, be problematic and even oppressive. In
part, this reflects the frozen way in which such geographies are
presented. The geographies of law-for example, the division between
the private workplace and the public domain-can appear in legal
discourse as facts of life or found objects. Further, the manner in which
legal geographies are defined can have problematic effects, both in an
immediate and a more indirect sense. A useful claim of recent legal
theory is that legal categories and distinctions not only draw upon
consciousness, but form it, such that everyday language becomes imbued
with the vocabulary of rights, property, and legality. The geographies of
law may serve a similar constitutive function, both shaping and
constraining the social, imaginary, and popular readings of the spatiality
of social life. At the same time, it must be recognized that such
geographies, like the histories of law, are necessarily conditional and
partial. Not only are they often contradictory, but alternative legal maps
can be constructed to challenge those which are dominant. There is
potential, in other words, to destabilize the frozen spaces of legal
discourse.
We will attempt to demonstrate the analytical potential of a
critical legal geography through a theoretical commentary upon recent
American and Canadian decisions on federalism and worker safety, with
particular emphasis on their construction and reification of spatial
boundaries and legal categories. The effect, we shall suggest, is
frequently to "space out" certain people, by virtue of their supposed
"geo-legal" location, and deny them the protection accorded other
citizens. The cases we will analyze arise in somewhat different contexts
in each country. The American cases ask whether state criminal law can
be used to sanction employers for dangerous and unhealthy working
conditions when federal occupational health and safety standards
apply;28 while the Canadian cases are concerned with the application of
provincial occupational health and safety laws to employers who are
within federal jurisdiction. In legal terms, a different kind of
jurisdictional dispute is raised by each set of cases. What we find
28 In Canada, analyses of the use and non-use of criminal law to sanction employers for death
and injury of employees can be found in HJ. Glasbeek, "Why Corporate Deviance is not Treated as
a Crime-The Need to Make 'Profits' a Dirty Word" (1984) 22 Osgoode Hall L.J. 393; and E.M.
Tucker, AdministeringDanger in the Workplace: The Law and Politics of OccupationalHealth and
Safety Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).
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interesting, however, is the way the legal discourse in each context draws
upon the same ideologies of work and space.
IV. THE CASE STUDIES

In a regulatory vacuum created by weak enforcement of federal
health and safety standards,29 many local prosecutors in the United
States have instituted proceedings against employers in whose workplace
employees have died.30 Rather than using the federal Occupational
Health and Safety Act, 31 such initiatives by local prosecutors have relied
upon the traditional police powers of the states, including laws designed
to protect the local citizenry from violent crime. Employers and
supervisors have been charged with such offences as manslaughter,
aggravated battery, reckless conduct, and criminally negligent homicide.
These local initiatives, not surprisingly, have prompted a litigation storm.
Defendant employers have challenged the constitutionality of local
prosecutions, claiming that the existence of the federal osHA expresses a
Congressional intent that worker safety be administered by federal, not
state, regulations. Accordingly, employers have argued that local
initiatives should be preempted and that prosecutions concerning worker
29 In the United States, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) has faced
budget cuts and has been obliged to adopt a less "confrontational" approach to enforcement.
Critics have charged that policy changes such as the move to self reporting of workplace injuries
have lead to severe abuses. It has also been argued that OSHA is inadequate for enforcing worker
health and safety standards. See National Safe Workplace Institute, Criminal Job Safety
Prosecutions: Lessons Learned,Prospectsfor the Future (Chicago: NSWI, 1990).
30 W. Glaberson, "States are Toppling Workplace-Injury Convictions" New York Times (19
September 1989) Al, D5. Glaberson reports that more than 200 such proceedings were launched
by September 1988. The concerns leading to this strategy are expressed by Jay Magnuson in
"Interview with Jay Magnuson, Deputy Chef, Public Interest Bureau, Cook County (Illinois) State's
Attorney" Corp. Crime Reporter (27 April 1987) 7 at 8. Asked why there had been an upsurge in
local prosecutions, Magnuson noted that "[iut has become apparent to [local prosecutors] that in
fact the federal government is not doing the kind of job that we expected. Therefore, it falls back to
the traditional local level to enforce": ibid. at 8. Magnuson continued that such a move might
overturn certain assumptions about criminality. The problem was that of convincing a judge "whose
idea of crime was to put a gun to somebody's head and take their money ...
[that] robbing somebody
of their health is really no different": ibid. at 8.
It is also interesting to note that similar local responses and legal debates concerning
preemption have occurred in other employment contexts. H. Weinstein, "Protections for Workers
Now Challenged by Federal Laws" LosAngeles Times (21 February 1989) A5.
31 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1982) [hereinafter OSHA].
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safety can only be launched under the federal schemer

2

State

prosecutors have responded by arguing that section 4(b)(4) of the
osHAl 33 which provides that the "common law, or statutory rights, duties
or liabilities of employers and employees" are to be preserved with
respect to injuries or deaths "arising out of, or in the course of
employment," expresses a Congressional intent to preserve the
applicability of the pre-existing state criminal laws under which
employers are being charged. Some courts in the United States have
rejected, and others have accepted, the prosecutors' argument. The law
is currently unsettled 4 In all of the cases employers or supervisors were
32

2 of the United States Constitution states that federal law is "the supreme law of
Art. VI, cl.
the land." On the basis of this provision, it has been held by courts that state laws are preempted by
federal laws where an explicit or implicit Congressional intent to preempt can be inferred from
federal legislation.
Employers have argued that an implicit congressional intent to preempt state criminal laws
from application to worker safety can be found to rely upon section 18 of the OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 667
shall prevent any State agency or court from asserting
(1982), which states that "[n]othing ...
jurisdiction under State law over any occupational safety or health issue with respect to which no
standard is in effect under § 655 of this title." Section 655 provides for the promulgation of
workplace safety standards. This is taken to mean that Congress intended an absolute preemption
of local prosecutions concerning worker safety. The argument in support of this interpretatioA is
encapsulated in Sabine Consolidated Inc. v. State, 756 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)
[hereinafter Sabine]:
We read [s. 18(a)] to mean that the states are free to establish and enforce any laws relating to
worker safety so long as those laws or actions do not entail establishing or enforcing standards
affecting occupational safety issues that are addressed by OSHA standards. We are not alone
in this interpretation. '[Section 18(a)] has been consistently interpreted by OSHA and the
courts to bar the exercise of state jurisdiction over issues addressed by OSHA standard, even
where the state law may arguably be more stringent or where OSHA has not explicitly
addressed a provision.' New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 600 F. Supp. 606
We hold that § 667(a) absolutely preempts all state regulation of workplace
(D.N.J. 1985) ...
safety where such regulation would effectively establish standards in areas governed by OSHA.
33

Supra note 31.

34 Several lower state courts have held in favour of preemption-for example, see People v.
ChicagoMagnet Wire Corporation,510 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. Ct. App. 1987) [hereinafter Magnet Wire (I11.
C.A.)]--as has one higher state court: Sabine, supra note 32. Decisions in favour of preemption
were the dominant tendency until quite recently: see, for discussion, Note, "Getting Away With
Murder: Federal OSHA Preemption of State Criminal Prosecutions for Industrial Accidents" (1987)
101 Harv. L Rev. 535; and N.K. Blomley, "Federalism, Place and the Regulation of Worker Safety"
(1990) 66 Econ. Geography 22. A prosecutor in Los Angeles has noted, "I feel that these courts are
wrong. However, when as many courts are as wrong as are wrong here, you don't have a great deal
of hope of getting this reversed"; as quoted in Glaberson, supra note 30.
More recently, decisions appear to be going the other way. In Illinois, Michigan, and New
York, the high courts have rejected the preemption argument: see People v. Chicago Magnet Wire
1989) [hereinafter Magnet Wire (Ill. S.Ct.)].; Peoplev. Hegedus, 443
Corporation,534 N.E. 2d 962 (Ill.
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prosecuted on charges of homicide, manslaughter, or assault following

the death or injury of a worker in the course of employment. Where the
prosecutions were unsuccessful, the courts held that section 4(b)(4) only
preserved the rights of an injured worker qua employee and did not
validate the application of state regulation, in the form of criminal law,
designed to protect the local citizenry.3 5
In Canada, federal legislation and enforcement mechanisms
concerning worker health and safety are, on the whole, weaker and less
stringently enforced than provincial laws. Accordingly, the effects of
excluding the application of provincial legislation are tangible. In
several recent cases, employees and inspectors have attempted to bring
within the ambit of provincial health and safety laws, enterprises that fall
into the constitutional category of "federal works or undertakings." 3 6
Employment matters in such enterprises are within exclusive federal
jurisdiction.3 7 Provincial attorneys general supporting the application of
provincial health and safety laws to such undertakings therefore had to
argue that such laws did not relate only to employment matters, but also
to local public health-a matter squarely within provincial jurisdiction. 38
Occupational health and safety in federal works and undertakings thus
had two aspects: regulation of employment in a federal undertaking
N.W.2d 127 (Mich. Sup. Ct. 1989) [hereinafterHegedus];People v.Pymm, 563 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1990)
[hereinafter Pymm]; and NationalSolid Wastes ManagementAssociationv. Kiian, 918 F.2d 671 (7th
Cir. 1990).
In Asta v. Illinois, 110 S.Ct. 52 (1989), cert. denied,sub nom., the United States Supreme Court
refused to decide the issue, denying certiorarion an appeal from the decision in Magnet Wire (Ill.
S.Ct). Accordingly, whether or not criminal prosecutions relating to worker safety are permissible
will vary from state to state, depending on what the courts in each state have held.
35 See cases cited supranote 34.
36 "Federal undertakings" is the term used to describe undertakings falling under federal
jurisdiction by virtue of ss. 92(10)(a-c) and 91(29) of the ConstitutionAct, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31
Vict., c. 3. Under this scheme, the following fall within federal jurisdiction:
(a) Lines of Steam or other ships, Railways, Canals, Telegraphs, and other Works and
Undertakings connecting the Province with any other or others of the Provinces, or extending
beyond the Limits of the Province;
(b) Lines of Steam Ships between the Province and any British or Foreign Country;
(c) Such Works as, although wholly situated within the Province, are before or after their
Execution declared by the Parliament of Canada to be for the general advantage of Canada or
for the Advantage of two or more of the Provinces.
The undertakings at issue in the cases, infra note 40, all clearly fell within these criteria.
37
Commission du salaireminimum v. Bell Telephone Co., [1966] S.C.R. 767.
38

Schneider v. R, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 112.
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(federal) and regulation of health (provincial) 9 This argument was
*rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in a trilogy of cases. 40 While
acknowledging that "general legislative jurisdiction over health belongs
to the provinces," 41 Beetz J. wrote for a unanimous Court, "the Act [Act
Respecting OccupationalHealth And Safety] is not related to the subject
matter of health"42 and "[t]he health and safety of workers are no more
than a purely nominal 'aspect' " of occupational health and safety
legislation. 43 Therefore, Beetz J. held such legislation could not be
applied to protect workers employed within federal undertakings
because employment matters in these undertakings are within exclusive
federal jurisdiction.
V. A CRITICAL LEGAL GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS
The American and Canadian courts have found that local laws
protecting worker health and safety are ousted by federal laws in the
contexts described. We will argue that, despite obvious differences
between the two countries and the legal frameworks of the examples, the
courts' decisions are justified and explained with reference to similar
spatial/legal reifications. Both sets of decisions draw upon liberalism
and specific conceptions of social and political life peculiar to capitalism.
We will interrogate the decisions in terms of how they construct a
particular geography of power. At an immediate level, how are the
individuals who are potentially and actually killed, injured, and made
sick understood by the courts? Where exactly are they located? Put
simply, are they understood first and foremost as citizens within a local
jurisdiction subject to the protection of local measures designed to
protect the public (e.g., criminal and public health laws), or are they
understood as occupying a special category that precludes such
protection? Our aim is to explore the ideological conjunction of legal
39

See infra at 684-85.
Alltrans Express Ltd. v. Workers' Compensation Board of British Columbia, [1988] 1 S.C.R.
897; Bell Canada v. Commission de la santi et de la sdcuri6 du travail, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749
[hereinafter Bell]; and CanadianNationalRailway Co. v. Courtois,[1988] 1 S.C.R 868.
41
Bell, ibid. at 761.
40

42 ibid. at 815 [emphasis added].
43 ibid. at 854.
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and spatial distinctions. In particular, we will analyze the cases under
study in terms of several dichotomies: citizen/employee, local
community/workplace, and public/private. We will argue that the
intelligibility and ideological power of the courts' reasoning in support of
their decisions ousting federal laws rests upon the reification and
conjunction of these distinctions. Before doing so, however, it is
necessary to look at how the courts' reasons for concluding that local
regulation aimed at protecting members of the public, that is, citizens,
does not apply to people when involved in employment relations; and, by
way of corollary, that legislation aimed at protecting workers cannot be
characterized as public protection regulation. 44
For the U.S. pro-preemption courts, the rejection of the local
prosecutors' arguments is justified partly by the "course of employment"
language in section 4(b)(4) of the os-A which, according to these courts,
precludes local prosecutions. In Sabine, for example, this language was
relied upon by the Court to hold that the section "addresses only actions
between employers and employees, not the relationship between state
and federal law or the right of state prosecuting attorneys to bring
criminal prosecutions." 45 Similarly, in Magnet Wire, the Court stated:
the courts ...
have consistently found that the purpose of this section was to preserve the
existing private rights of injured employees relative to workman's compensation, state
tort law, and other common law remedies against employers but not to create any
additional civil remedies in favour of employees. 4 6

Therefore, the distinctive context in which the fatalities
occurred-private employment relations-precludes the application of
local regulation protecting citizens from violent crimes. It follows that
any local intervention must be of a distinct character, that is,
employment related. The law, as applied to employment relations,
undergoes a curious transformation. No longer a form of criminal law, it
is redefined as an attempt to set up worker safety standards. This logical
inversion is performed in Sabine, where the Court rejects the application

44 For an excellent discussion and empirical analysis of the differential standards applied to
the health of workers and members of the public, see P. Derr, R. Goble, R.E. Kasperson & R.W.

Kates, "Responding to the Double Standard of Worker/Public Protection" in J. Banfield, ed.,
Readingsin Law and Society (North York, Ont.: Captus Press, 1991) 250.

45 Sabine,supra note 32 at 868.
46

Magnet Wire (Ill. C.A.),supra note 34 at 1175.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 No. 3

of Texas criminal law to employment relations on the basis that it
becomes an "employment standard" when so applied; it is thereby
necessarily preempted by federal regulations.47 Thus, an attempt to
charge the president of a company with criminal negligence following
the death of two construction workers in a trench collapse was redefined
as an attempt
to establish local standards governing the digging of trenches ... criminal prosecution
based on the violation of state or local standards for working conditions [amounts] to an
impermissible attempt to regulate through the state criminal laws, conduct now regulated
under OSHA. By prosecuting the appellant for not digging trenches safely, the State
48

intruded on an area covered by OSHA regulations.

Turning to the Canadian cases, it might seem strange that
worker health and safety legislation is considered by the Supreme Court
of Canada to have nothing to do with public health. It is one thing to say
that health and safety legislation relates to working conditions and
labour relations as well as to health, but it is quite another to say it does
not relate to health at all. Yet this is what Beetz J. said. The key to
understanding his reasoning lies, once again, in the presumption that
there is something distinctive about employment that puts workers
outside the scope of regulation designed to protect the public. "I ... do

not think," Beetz J. said, "that the Act is intended to protect the health
and safety of people in the province in general. It governs relations
between worker and employer."49 Because of their status as employees,
workers cease to be members of the public and, therefore, cannot be the
beneficiaries of public health protection. The "citizen" is effectively
taken out of the "worker," leaving only the "employee." And, as with
the pro-preemption U.S. cases, law that applies to employment can only
be understood as employment related. Thus, legislation with the express
purpose of eliminating dangers to the "health, safety and physical wellbeing of workers" 50 cannot be related to public health, but must be

47

Sabine,supra note 32. For the legal framework of this argument, see ibid.

48

Sabine,ibid, at 868-69 [emphasis added].

49

Bell, supra note 40 at 809.

50

An Act Respecting OccupationalHealth and Safety, S.Q. 1979, c. 63, s. 2.
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related to working conditions and labour relations-matters within the
private world of employment 51
Central to the reasoning in both the U.S. pro-preemption cases
and the Supreme Court of Canada's decisions is an implicit construction
of two classes of people: employee and citizen. This, in turn, relates to
some variant of liberal ideology and its attendant separation between the
public and the private spheres. Critical analyses of judicial discourse
have revealed just how central the public/private construct is to
adjudication of issues, particularly those arising in the context of labour
relations and the family 52 Traditionally, employment relations have
been constructed in law as a private domain, defined by the instruments
of private ordering (contracts) and the various rights attendant to
ownership of productive property.5 3 This has considerable explanatory
power in the current context. When the worker goes to work she enters
the private sphere of employment. She is classified as an "employee"
and is no longer entitled to the protection afforded to her as a "citizen,"
that is, as a member of the public. By reifying the related distinctions of
public/private and citizen/employee, the courts are able to make
intelligible the denial to employees of local regulation designed to
protect the public.5 4
We want to argue further that the reification of these
dichotomies is strengthened by the reification of another distinction, a

51 According to Beetz J., occupational health and safety provisions "fall within the scope of

the contract of employment;" they "articulate the terms of the contract of employment, in the same
way as does a collective agreement which contains preventive clauses dealing with occupational

health and safety," (see supra note 40 at 799), and establish the respective "rights and obligations of
the worker and the employer": ibid. at 809.
52 K.E. Klare, "The Public/Private Distinction in Labour Law" (1981-82) 130 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1358; F.E. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform" (1982-83)

96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497; and J. Fudge, "The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities and the
Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles" (1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ.
485; and J. Fudge, "Labour, the New Constitution and Old Style Liberalism" in Labour Law Under
the Charter (Kingston: Queen's Law Journal and Industrial Relations Centre, 1988) 61. Early

critical theorists, like Marx and those in the Marxian tradition, have recognized the public/private
distinction as a central ideological component of capitalism. See, eg., K. Marx, "on the Jewish
Question" in L. olletti, ed., Marx's Early Writings (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975).
53

p. Macklem, "Property, Status, and workplace Organizing" (1990) 40 U.T.L.J. 74.

54 At the same time, it is crucial to remember that the categories of "public" and "private,"
and particularly the idea of a private and depoliticized workplace, which are embedded in legal

discourse, are historically rooted in the material, social relations of capitalism.
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spatial distinction between the workplace and the local community.
There is an implicit, and sometimes explicit, conjunction of this spatial
representation with the legal discursive distinctions. Some have begun
the exploration of the relationship between spatial and discursive
distinctions. For example, Kay Anderson seeks to spatialize and
socialize apparently "natural" discursive distinctions of race as expressed
in late nineteenth century Vancouver.55 She argues persuasively that
race is a social construction and, importantly, that it is one bound up
with geographic classifications. Therefore, the designation of a
residential area within Vancouver as Chinatown is far from an innocent
act, but rather represents an arbitrary classification of space which
becomes bound up, in complex ways, with an arbitrary social
classification.5 6
[A]s a concrete form Chinatown has been a critical nexus through which a system of
racial classification has been continuously constructed. Racial ideology has been
materially embedded in space ... and it is through 'place' that it has been given a local
57
referent, become a social fact, and aided in its own reproduction.

The categories "Chinese" and "Chinatown" are, in that sense, doubly
reified. Discursive distinctions come to define the spatial category
Chinatown, which, along with its material presence, serves to reinforce
and reproduce the discursive distinction Chinese.58 The social and
political significance of this process is substantial. The spatial
boundaries constructed around Chinatown provide powerful
underpinnings of a racial ideology that constructs people of Chinese
descent as "other," and thus serves to legitimate their oppression.
Similarly, we want to suggest that the discursive and ideological
boundaries constructed by the courts around the employment
relationship, and reified to justify shielding it from public protection
regulation, are partly referable to the workplace, a spatial construct,
which assists in reproducing the discursive category "employee." The
dynamic is similar to that in Anderson's analysis where the place

55 "The Idea of Chinatown: The Power of Place and Institutional Practice in the Making of a
Racial Category" (1987) 77 Annals A. Am. Geography 580.
56
Ibid. at 584.
57
58

Ibid.
Ibid. at 583-85.
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reference of Chinatown aids in the reproduction of the category
Chinese. When the worker enters the workplace, she enters a space
which, like Chinatown, is materially and discursively constructed as
separate from the local community. In ideological terms, she crosses
from the local public domain into the private domain; correspondingly,
her status is transformed from a citizen to an employee. To this extent

geographically locating the worker within the workplace reinforces the
category of employee. Crossing the spatial/legal boundary effectively

removes the worker from her community and re-classifies her in law as
being outside the scope of her local community's legitimate concerns. 59
The proposed relationship between place, legal discourses, and
ideologies around employment are necessarily speculative at this
point-more work would need to be done, and on a wider set of
materials, to draw stronger conclusions. Nonetheless, there is some
interesting evidence of the relationship in the cases we review. The
workplace/employee conjunction is implicitly, and occasionally explicitly,
relied upon to establish a boundary around the private sphere of work
59 In this, it may be that another geography is at issue, that of central/local state relations. By
effectively removing or abstracting the employment relationship from the locality, it is placed
beyond the protection and obligations of a local jurisdiction. It no longer makes a difference where
it is located given the uniformity of federal occupational health and safety regulations in both
countries. Disenfranchised, the worker and manager are no longer subject to the liabilities and
rights that inhere in membership in a locality-a place. The workplace occupies space but is not
located in a place. Therefore, a vision of the workplace as private presupposes a privileging of the
central or, more accurately, the non-local. Perhaps it is possible that the reverse applies-a specific
vision of the local presupposes the privatization of the workplace. As N.K. Blomley has argued in
"Federalism, Place and the Regulation of Worker Safety," supra note 34, pro-preemption
arguments often include a suspicion of the locality as an imperfect manifestation of liberal political
relations. The U.S. courts, industrialists, and policy makers make frequent reference to the
regulatory chaos that would ensue if different localities established what were in effect different
OSHA standards. Chicago attorney Edward B. Miller, whose firm prepared the anicus brief filed by
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and other business groups, noted that his clients stated that
companies "would rather have a uniform federal standard for workplace safety than be at the mercy
of however many thousand district attorneys, who are each determining what the safety standards
should be for individual companies": quoted in "Prosecution of Employers for Safety Violations
not Pre-empted by OSH Act, Illinois Court Rules" OccupationalSafety and Health Reporter (8
February 1989) 1611 at 1612. A liberal anxiety about doctrinaire localism and the illegitimate force
of the local group apparently can be avoided by carving off the marketplace as private and
individualist. Freed from the vagaries of the local community, it accords more closely with one
strand of liberal political thought. One might speculate that, in Canada too, there is a desire for
regulatory uniformity, at least with respect to "federal undertakings" and other matters that are
"interprovincial" in scope: see R.E. Simeon "Criteria for Choice in a Federal System" (1982-83) 8
Queen's L.J. 131. At the same time, however, it should be noted that labour relations in nonfederal undertakings falls within provincial jurisdiction.

680

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 30 No. 3

relations, thus shielding this sphere from regulation designed to protect
the local public. When discussing employment, the courts often use the
term workplace to refer to employment relations in general, rather than
any work site in particular; therefore, they discursively link relations of
employment to a particular place referent. In Magnet Wire and Sabine,
for example, the issue of worker safety is discussed in terms of workplace
safety, and the regulation of employment is referred to as regulation of
the workplace. 60 To similar effect, in Bell, in support of his argument
that provincial health and safety laws infringe on employers' managerial
authority, Beetz J. refers approvingly to government reports that speak
of the impact and effect of such laws on the operation and organization
of the workplace. 61 In each of these examples, a spatial representation is
used to describe a social relation (employment); the representation also
contributes to the construction and reification of legal boundaries
around that social relation.
The spatiality of the discursive distinctions constructed by the
courts is perhaps most apparent in a set of alternative accounts of place
and power relied upon in the United States by local prosecutors and
some state high courts for challenging the immunization of employment
from state criminal law. While at an immediate level local prosecutors
seek to secure convictions of employers and supervisors, their arguments
for applying criminal sanctions to employers rely upon an interesting remapping of the employee and employer. They explicitly reject the
spatial boundaries that construct the private workplace as distinct from
the local public domain, and the employee as distinct from the citizen.
Therefore, they debunk the very basis for denying the benefits of local
public protection regulation (criminal law) to workers. The prosecutors'
accounts illustrate how the dissolution or construction of a spatial/legal
boundary becomes critically important to mapping and remapping the
status and legal entitlements of the worker. An alternative map of legal
obligations and rights also challenges the assumed objectivity and
necessity of the account found in the pro-preemption decisions by

60 Magnet Wire (Ill. C.A.), supra note 34 at 1176; and Sabine,supra note 32 at 867.
61 Bell, supra note 40 at 814-15.

1992]

A CriticalGeographyof Law

681

articulating internally coherent and plausible accounts which contradict

it. 62

The alternative account tries to resist privatization of the
workplace. The employment relation is remapped as situated in a public
place-a local community. Simultaneously, the employer and employee
are made local citizens, subject to the same rights and responsibilities as
other citizens. Such a remapping is necessarily hostile to the bright lines
of Magnet Wire63 and Sabine.64 Local prosecutors in the United States

note, again and again, both the artificiality of the distinction between the
workplace and other spatial settings within a locality, and the associated

divide between employee and citizen.
[I]f
there was an explosion stemming from hazardous conditions and dozens of workers
died, local prosecutors would be preempted from prosecution. Yet if the explosion
resulted in the deaths of residents in the surrounding area, or a passerby, or a delivery
person, we would not be preempted from prosecution. All these deaths would occur due
to the same reckless or negligent conduct. But we could prosecute only for the death of
65
those who were employed by the factory.
There is no difference between exposing a crowd to a bullet and exposing workers to a
lethal substance. ... People are coming to understand that when a person is killed it is not
necessarily an accident. Sometimes it's a crime. 6 6

62 The alternative account has been accepted by some courts. Thus, for example, in Hegedus,
supra note 34 at 135, the Court asserts that the reference to "rights, duties or liabilities" in section
653 of OSHA is not confined to theprivate rights of workers, but is meant to includepublic criminal
laws. The Court states, at 135, "the manslaughter law under which the state seeks to impose
'statutory liability' upon the defendant qualifies as 'any law' under the [section's] language ...
the
section does not appear to be in any way qualified, other than in by the 'arising out of, in the course
of employment' language." See also Magnet Wire, supra note 34; and Pymm, supra, note 34.
63

Supra note 34.

64

Supra note 32.
65 Cook County District Attorney Richard Daley quoted in Committee on Government
Operations, Getting Away With Murderin the Workplace: OSHA's Non-Use of CriminalPenaltiesfor
Safety Violations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988) at 10.
66 Los Angeles Special Assistant District Attorney Jan Chatten Brown quoted in "Local
Officials Set Up New Programs as Others Urge Caution Over Trend to Use Criminal Prosecutions
for workplace Hazards" OccupationalSafety andHealth Reporter (4 April 1985) 1132 at 1132 and at
1133.
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Such claims have recently been accepted by the high courts of several
states.67 In Hegedus, for example, the Court stated:
While OSHA is concerned with protecting employees as "workers" ... the state is
concerned with protecting the employees as "citizens" from criminal conduct. Whether
this conduct occurs in public or in private, in the home or in the workplace, the 68state's
interest in preventing it, and punishing, it is indeed both legitimate and substantial.

Essentially, the assertion here is that there is something artificial about
removing the workplace from the locality.
One might speculate that the local prosecutors' collapsing of the
workplace/local community distinction relates to their location in the
local community. The distinction between public and private worlds
imagines, in the abstract, two discrete domains. Perhaps local
prosecutors are in a position to test such abstractions, and the reified
categories and boundaries constructed by the courts, against the lived
world of the locality of which they are a part. In mapping out these
abstractions, local prosecutors note the contiguity and spatial overlap of
the public and the private. The work site occupies, apparently, the same
space as the public sites. The employer and employee are not entirely
enclosed by the private domain, but live, die, and are injured in the same
public space as other local citizens. Speculatively, then, one might argue
that the very materiality of the work site and its physical location render
it difficult for local prosecutors to think of the work site as abstracted
from the locality. Moreover, the physicality of the worker and manager,
and their shared participation in the two worlds of work and locality,
make any attempt to decontextualize either intuitively implausible.
By locating the worker and manager spatially within the locality,
both are also redefined legally as bound by a set of rights and obligations

67As one commentator has stated:
Debate on the preemption of state criminal prosecutions is unsettled, but it appears that
anti-preemption forces have gained the advantage. Although OSHA has no formal
position on the issue and the Supreme Court recently declined to decide it, strong
arguments against preemption have come from academicians, Congress, the Justice
Department, and the high courts of three major industrial states.
S.D. Jones, "State Prosecutions for Safety-Related Crimes in the Workplace: Can D.A.'s Succeed
Where OSHA Failed?" (1990) 79 Ky. L.J. 139 at 140.
68

Hegedus,supra note 34 at 134.
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that inhere in the concept of citizenship. 6 9 Implicit in this remapping is
another claim about geography and power. Local prosecutors and some
judges insist on the special and distinctive qualities of decentralized
political life and the locality in which the worker and manager share by
virtue of their location. Local U.S. prosecutors often make reference to
certain qualities of the decentralized polity, including its traditional
police power. Jay Magnuson, the head of the Cook County States
Attorney who investigated Film Recovery System Inc., commented
following a workplace fatality,
local prosecutors have this traditional belief that their role is to protect their citizens and
to ensure the safety and health of their citizens no matter where they are. If we are to
protect citizens on the highway from drunk drivers or on the sidewalks, in theatres, in
restaurants, who is to say to us that we cannot protect their health and safety inside a
70
workplace?

Once again, the high courts of several states have recently indicated an
openness to such arguments. In Magnet Wire, the Court stated:
The power to prosecute criminal conduct has traditionally been regarded as properly
within the scope of state superintendence ... The regulation of health and safety has also
71
been considered as "primarily and historically" a matter of local concern.

The basis of this claim is unclear, except for an assumption of the
essential worth and value of decentralized political action. This may

correspond with a variant of liberal thought which assumes the political
life of the individual is ideally lived out at the local level. Such a political

life includes the right to political and legal agency-the right to structure

The concept of citizenship is, of course, a profoundly spatial one. Its present usage, that of
a native or naturalized member of a state, indicates a territorially finite set of rights and obligations
that non-citizens cannot share in. By virtue of the crossing of a political boundary, those rights and
obligations can change. However, the historical roots of citizenship have a different inflection that
is of greater relevance to our argument. Citizenship, historically, was defined in decentralized terms
as that of membership within the city. Both city and citizen share a similar Latin root, in civitas.
That status also embodied certain spatially discrete legal rights and obligations as expressed in city
charters, such as the right to self-government and legal enactment and adjudication. See H.J.
Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formationof the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1983); and M.E. Tigar, Law and the Rise of Capitalism (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1977).
70 "Interview with Jay Magnuson," supra note 30 at 8.
69

71 Magnet Wire (Ill. S.Ct.), supranote 34 at 966.
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and regulate an immediate local environment in line with a normative
vision. Decentralization, defined by the pro-preemption decisions as an
obstacle to efficient regulation, becomes redefined here as an essential
component of political life.
An alternative account can be found as well in the Canadian
cases. As noted above, provincial attorneys general argued in these
cases that health and safety regulation is concerned with public health as
well as employment matters. 7 2 Within contemporary constitutional
doctrine in Canada the fact that Parliament has regulated a particular
area of activity does not necessarily preclude a provincial legislature
from regulating in that area of activity. Double regulation is thereby
allowed. Accordingly, provincial lawyers argued that the province could
regulate health and safety in federal undertakings by virtue of its
jurisdiction over public health, while the federal government could
regulate by virtue of its jurisdiction over employment in such
undertakings. Implicit in this argument is a rejection of the
distinctiveness of the employment relation as private, and therefore
removed from the domain of public health. In the Court of Appeal
decision in Ailtrans Express Ltd. v. Workers' Compensation Board of
B.C.73 , for example, Lambert J., writing for the Court, reasoned that the
matter of "health and safety in the work place of a federal undertaking"
had both provincial and federal aspects. The federal aspect was that of
"working condition[s] in the employer-employee relationship." 7 4 The
provincial aspect was "the concern of the province, generally, for public
health and for medical and hospital care, and, more particularly, for the
scheme of worker safety, treatment and compensation embodied in the
Workers' CompensationAct."75 Similarly, a majority of the Quebec Court
of Appeal in Bell concluded "that the object of the dispute is related to

72 For example, the factum of the Attorney General of Quebec states at 5: "En tant quo
r6glementation sur la sant6 de la travailleuse enceinte et de renfant Anaitre, le systame du retraft
pr6ventif de la travailleuse enceinte, en 1'esp6ce, devrait P-tre applicable aux entreprises ftdfrales do
la m~me fagon que toute autre l6gislation provinciale en mati~re de sant6 publique."
73 (1983), 149 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at 390 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafterAllirans],rev'd supra note 40.
74

75

ibid.

Ibid. at 389.
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related to both health and labour relations." 76 In both decisions, the
appellate courts were unprepared to draw the kind of bright line
between public health and the private workplace that is relied upon by
the Supreme Court of Canada in its decisions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we want to make two points. The first relates to
the immediate implications of these decisions; the second is more
theoretical. The immediate implications are relatively clear cut.
Working people will continue to die, get sick, and be injured at work in
the United States and in Canadian federal undertakings, but they will
not be protected by state criminal laws or provincial health and safety
laws, despite the inadequacies of federal regimes. 77 Employers,
conversely, will likely face lighter penalties, weaker standards, and,
accordingly, lower production costs. As the Supreme Court of Illinois
noted, to accept the claims of pro-preemption courts "would, in effect,
convert the statute [osiA], which was enacted to create a safe work
environment for the nations workers, into a grant of immunity for
employers responsible for serious injuries or deaths of employees." 78 As
well, the Committee on Government Operations has noted: "we have,
in effect, set a price on the life of the American worker. It is only
$10,000, the maximum fine allowed for a violation of a provision of the
osHA."7'9 Similarly, in Canada, owners and managers of federal
undertakings are likely relieved that their operations are outside the
jurisdiction of provincial standards, inspectors, and investigators. The
76 Bell Canadav. Quibec (Commission de la sant6et de la securit6du travail) (1985), 16 D.LR.
(4th) 345 at 358 (Que. C.A.), aff'd [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749. However, the majority was of the view that a
conflict existed between the federal and provincial schemes, rendering the federal scheme
paramount and the provincial scheme inoperative: ibid. at 358.
77 For example, as concerns the particular issue in the Canadian cases analyzed, the
complainant in that case and others similarly situated would likely not be able to refuse Video
Display Terminal (VDT) work under the federal Act because the Canada Labour Relations Board
has held that VDTs are not dangerous to pregnant women and, therefore, there was no reasonable
cause to refuse work. See Law Reform Commission of Canada, Workplace Pollution (Working
Paper 53) (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986) at 35 n. 168.
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Magnet Wire (Ill. S.Ct.), supranote 34 at 969.
79 Supra note 65.
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loss, of course, falls on workers in such enterprises who are denied the
added protection of provincial legislation. One can only speculate at this
point, but it would seem that an immediate consequence of the
Canadian decisions will be more deaths, injuries, and illnesses in federal
undertakings.
However, this begs a series of questions relating to the
implications of our analysis for progressive struggles around work and
beyond. Should workers abandon federal regulatory regimes that have
failed them, and seek protection in others, whether provincial worker
safety law or local criminal law? Do worker struggles which centre,
perhaps unwittingly, on a claim concerning the separability of the
workplace contribute to the reification of the spaces of the public and
the private, and the spacing out of certain categories of people? Put
more geographically, should workers concentrate their efforts on
obtaining local regulatory relief, given its more favourable track record
in these case studies, or should they direct their attention to the national
arena? Any unconditional answer which equates the locality with
"good" politics or uncritically rejects the public/private distinction runs
the risk of simply re-freezing the map in the process. Though in the
present context, a convincing pragmatic argument can be made for
challenges to the public/private distinction and demands for local rather
than federal protection, this need not hold for all cases. Indeed, it
should be remembered that there are dangers with such a strategy. In
the American context pressure has been applied by labour to local
prosecutors only reluctantly, because using the criminal law not only
constitutes a politically dangerous admission that federal worker safety
law is beyond hope but also marks a problematic individualization of
worker/management relations. 80 Moreover, historically, in the United
States, advocacy for greater protection of workers' health sought
recognition that the workplace was distinct from other places and that
workers' health was a labour issue, not a public health issue. 81 That the
same argument is now made in the United States and Canada to deny
workers greater protection suggests the danger in drawing strategic
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81 D. Rosner & G. Markowitz, "Research or Advocacy: Federal Occupational Health Policies
During the New Deal" in Rosner & Markowitz, eds., Dying for Work (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1989) 83.
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conclusions that are not attentive to extant political and ideological
conditions.
In relation to the immediate implications of these decisions,
however, our purpose is not to offer strategic or programmatic
prescriptions. We only want to challenge the frozen manner in which
law, space, and locality are frequently conceived. Such conceptions, and
the practices they relate to, need not (perhaps, cannot) be overturned,
and, in some contexts, a powerful case can be made for their tactical use
in progressive struggles. However, they must not be taken as given, and
we should be wary of their effectiveness in naturalizing relations of
oppression and exploitation. This brings us to our second, and more
theoretical, concluding point.
Our ambition in this paper has been to build upon the insights of
both critical geography and critical legal studies in a way that allows for a
deeper understanding of the regulatory events we address than either
discipline alone would allow. In some sense, as we move from the
mainstream to the critical traditions in each of our disciplines, the
boundaries of the disciplines themselves begin to crumble. Once
geographers accept that space is not a backdrop to political and social
action but is, instead, a product of such action, the role of law becomes
central to the analysis of space. Legal discourse, as a form of social
discourse, represents space in various ways and, in so doing, helps
construct the social significance of space. This has a bearing on social
and political life given that, in advanced industrial states, law is a crucial
site of social and political action. And, once lawyers accept that law both
constitutes and reflects social and power relations, it becomes crucial to
ask questions about the various ways such relations are constituted and
expressed. The social and political nature of space thus becomes a
central concern for critical analysts of law. At the same time, our two
disciplines do not simply collapse into one. They differ in their
emphases. For this reason, they inform and add to one another rather
than simply becoming the same.
In theoretical terms, we have attempted to draw upon critical
literatures in both law and geography. In one sense, both of these
literatures lend themselves to interdisciplinary inquiry given their
suspicion of the received methods and subjects of their disciplines.
While both have engaged in such interdisciplinary work, rarely have they
drawn upon each other. Such an intellectual closure, we have argued,
foreshortens the imaginative range and political possibilities of both, and
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does a disservice to the larger project of which both claim to be
members. Both critical traditions have a lot to learn from each other
and a lot to teach each other; an exchange between them is vital and
necessary.
We have attempted to make the case for the critical importance
of analyzing the intersection of spatial and legal discourse. Firstly, we
have tried to illustrate the mutually reinforcing ideological effect of legal
and spatial representations. By noting the geography of certain legal
constructions, such as the public/private divide, we have discovered that
they have the potential to be more powerfully formative of consciousness
than even critical legal scholars suggest. To reiterate, law can be
referred to as "frozen politics," the implication being that it represents
contingent social constructions as natural and apolitical. The social
representations of space can similarly become reified. The contested
geographies of social life are all too often presented as pre-political and
objective. As with law, the very objectivity of space renders such
representations opaque to critical insight. Consider, then, how much
more frozen and opaque the politics of representation become when
spatial and legal representations converge. A legal construction, such as
private property, perhaps becomes all the more natural when it has a
material/spatial referent, such as the workplace. As we have argued
above, the same may be true of the category "employee."
Much remains to be done in explicating the complex, messy, and
intriguing intersection of ideology, spatial representations, and
discursive, in particular legal, categories. Indeed, one might speculate
about other potential examples of spatial/discursive conjunctions that
have ideological significance. What, for example, is the relationship
between the "home," as a spatially defined set of boundaries, and gender
ideology;8 2 the "ghetto" or "inner city" and racial ideology;8 3 the
"reservation" and ideologies about First Nations;8 4 the "nation state"
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and national citizenship;8 5 or the "street" and ideologies of
criminality?8 6 In each of these examples, one might hypothesize that the
relevant discursive or ideological distinction is produced and reproduced
in part through its spatial referent.
Our analysis is critical in a second respect. We see the stability
and closure of legal/spatial constructions as having only a conditional
and partial effectiveness. Not only is legal discourse itself indeterminate,
but perhaps the spatial representations embedded within it are also
problematic. In part perhaps, this rests on their very spatiality. In our
examples, we characterize as abstractions the constructions of the U.S.
pro-preemption courts and the Supreme Court of Canada. If the
accounts of these courts exist anywhere, it is in a curious conceptual
space in which, for example, citizens are plucked out of their local
community context and redefined as employees and employers. A
spatial referent, the workplace, lends such abstractions an immediate
tangibility. Perhaps by resituating these abstractions in a complex,
specific, and evolving local milieu, with its own history of public health
regulation or criminal law enforcement, they can, on occasion and
dependent on contingent circumstances, be challenged successfully.
Prosecutors in the United States have challenged the very foundation of
the pro-preemption argument-the public/private distinction-by noting
the simple contiguity and co-presence of public and private space; they
have been successful, at least in some courts, in having the argument
rejected. At issue in their struggle is a cartography of power. The
prosecutors have demonstrated how the remapping of discursive
representations of social space can be an important and necessary part
and
of political praxis, although such discursive reconstructions
87
change.
social
achieving
reinterpretations are not sufficient for
We have tried in our analysis to be doubly critical in drawing
upon both critical geographic and critical legal analyses and in our
concern with the simultaneous power and instability of legal and spatial
representations. In conclusion, perhaps the task for a critical legal
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Interest and Transnational Norms" (1990) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1273.
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geography is threefold: identification of the frozen politics of legal and
spatial representations and an exploration of its implications;
demonstration of the social construction (and thus the non-objectivity)
of these representations; and, finally, a tactical analysis of the material
conditions under which challenging such dominant representations can
be part of a wider struggle for progressive social change.

